Cornell University Law School

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Risk, Speculation, and OTC Derivatives: An
Inaugural Essay for Convivium
Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law School, ls483@cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stout, Lynn A., "Risk, Speculation, and OTC Derivatives: An Inaugural Essay for Convivium," 1 Accounting, Economics, and Law
(2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Risk, Speculation, and OTC Derivatives: An
Inaugural Essay for Convivium
Lynn A. Stout

Abstract
Speculative trading, including speculative trading in derivatives, is often claimed to provide
social benefits by decreasing risk and improving the accuracy of market prices. This assumption
overlooks the possibility that speculation can be driven not just by differences in traders' risk
aversion and information investments, but also by differences in traders' subjective expectations.
Disagreement-based speculation erodes traders' returns, increases traders' risks, and can distort
market prices. There is reason to believe that by 2008, the market for OTC derivatives may have
been dominated by disagreement-based speculation that contributed to the Fall 2008 credit crisis.
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1. Introduction
In the Fall of 2008, the global finance industry was tipped into crisis following the
announcement of large trading losses suffered by insurance giant AIG in the overthe-counter (OTC) market for credit default swaps. Credit default swaps (CDS), a
type of financial derivative, are frequently described in the media as "insurance"
against declines in the creditworthiness of bond issuers. Insurance in turn is
typically thought of something that spreads and reduces risk. Yet the sudden
collapse of AIG, preceded by the derivatives-fueled collapses of investment banks
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, suggests that by 2008 the CDS "insurance"
market had gone seriously awry. Rather than spreading and reducing risk, overthe-counter CDS trading seemed to have concentrated and increased it. How?
There is an obvious tension between the claim that derivatives are used to
hedge against risk, and the observed increase in risk that actually accompanied the
explosive growth of the OTC derivatives market in this century's first decade.
This tension makes it worthwhile to revisit basic assumptions about what the OTC
derivatives market is about.
Derivatives often are described as "products," "investments," "assets,"
"innovations," and (as already noted) "insurance." This Essay argues these words
are misleading euphemisms. The simpler and far more accurate word that should
be used to describe derivatives is "bets." And while bets can indeed be used to
hedge against risk, they can also be used for a more economically questionable
activity-speculation. The common law has long recognized that speculative
betting on market phenomena can increase risk rather than reducing it.
Accordingly, the common law treated purely speculative derivatives contracts
quite differently from true hedging contracts. Contemporary regulators would do
well to heed the common law's common-sense example.

2. Derivatives as Bets
Finance theorists often divide derivatives into two basic categories, futures (a
contract of sale for future delivery of something at a price determined today), and
options (a contract of sale for future delivery of something at a price determined
today, where one party has the option to repudiate the contract). But the more
interesting and significant characteristic of derivatives contracts-the very thing
that makes them "derivative"-is the fact that they are futures and options
contracts where the underlying asset being "sold" is never actually delivered by
the seller, or received by the buyer. Indeed, neither buyer nor seller may ever
own, or even ever see, the underlying asset. Rather, one party to a derivatives
contract typically performs simply by paying the other some amount of money
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determined by changes in some market price, interest rate, or credit rating that
occur between the time the derivatives contract is entered, and the time the
contract is performed. This process of performing by "paying differences" (as
courts called it in the nineteenth century) makes clear the true nature of a
derivatives contract. A derivative is nothing more, or less, than a bet: a promise to
pay money determined by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some future event.
(Stout, 1999)
It is important to recognize that betting can be very useful for hedging
against risk. For example, if I own a house and I am worried about the risk it will
be destroyed by an earthquake, I can make a bet with an insurance company that
if an earthquake damages my house, the insurance company will pay me money in
an amount equal to the damage. Most people call this kind of wager
"homeowner's insurance," although a derivatives trader might a call it a "home
value swap." Whatever the label, when a person makes a bet that will pay off only
in the event she suffers some loss, her betting has had the economically beneficial
effect of offsetting the loss and so reducing her risk. It is truly insurance.
But bets can be used for purposes other than insurance. In particular, bets
can be used to speculate-to try to reap profits from predicting future prices,
interest rates, or credit ratings. In fact, bets are ideal vehicles for speculation.
Speculating in the spot markets for gold, houses, or interest rates by actually
buying and holding gold ingots, houses, or promissory notes is expensive,
difficult, and requires the commitment of significant capital. In contrast,
speculating by placing a bet can be virtually costless, at least until the bet comes
due. It is much cheaper and much easier to speculate on a company's
creditworthiness by entering a CDS agreement, than by buying and holding a
large portfolio of the company's bonds.

3. The Common Law Approach To Derivatives Betting
Laymen and lawmakers traditionally have looked on purely speculative
derivatives contracts with suspicion. In the popular mind, derivatives speculation
was just another form of gambling, associated with not only with increased risk,
but also with wastefulness and market manipulation. Reflecting this suspicion, the
common law drew a careful distinction between a derivatives contract in which at
least one party was truly hedging a preexisting commercial risk (deemed legally
enforceable), and a purely speculative derivatives bet between two parties who
were both trying to profit from predicting the future (deemed unenforceable as
against public policy). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1884:
"The generally accepted doctrine in this country is ... that a
contract for the sale of goods to be delivered in the future is
3
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valid, even though the seller has not the goods, nor any means
of getting them than to go into the market and buy them; but
such a contract is only valid when the parties really intend and
agree that the goods are to be delivered by the seller and the
price to be paid by the buyers; and, if under guise of such a
contract, the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise or fall
of prices, and the goods are not to be delivered, but one party is
to pay to the other the difference between the contract price and
the market price of the goods at the date fixed for executing the
contract, then the whole transaction constitutes nothing more
than a wager, and it is null and void." (Irwin v. Williar, 1884, at
508-09)

This rule against enforcing "difference contracts" (the nineteenth-century
term for derivatives) was subject to an important exception. Even when neither
party intended to make or to take delivery of the goods that had been "sold" under
the contract, a difference contract would be enforced if one of the parties could
prove it held an economic interest that would be damaged by the very same
occurrence that would allow it to profit from the wager. This "indemnity"
exception to the general rule of unenforceability was mirrored in insurance law,
which enforced insurance contract bets only when the policyholder sought
indemnification for an "insurable interest" at risk. (Stout, 1999, at 718, 724-25)
Why did common law courts view derivative contracts lacking an
indemnity interest as unenforceable on grounds of public policy? In brief, because
it viewed such contracts as gambling, and gambling in turn was believed to create
problems for both individuals and the broader society. In particular, gambling was
thought to pose the distinctly economic-as opposed to moral-concern that it
increased risk.
Unlike true hedging-which reduces risk, or at least assigns risk to a party
who can bear it more cheaply-gambling, including speculative derivatives
gambling, does indeed increase risk. The logic is straightforward. When two
people gamble, instead of two people who each have some money, we often end
up with one who has lots more money and one who has none. This increased
variation in wealth is, of course, the very definition of financial risk, which
economic theory typically posits reduces social welfare. Showing an intuitive
understanding of the costs of risk, the common law disfavored purely speculative
derivatives wagering because it "induces men to risk their money or property."
(Brua's Appeal, 1867, at 299) This was believed to contribute not only to the
impoverishment of the losing gamblers and their dependents, but to other social
problems as well, including "bankruptcies, defalcations of public officers,
embezzlements, [and] forgeries." (Cunningham v. National Bank of Augusta,
1882, at 403) In an eerie presage of the 2008 credit crisis, one nineteenth century
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opinion fretted that enforcing speculative off-exchange derivatives would increase
the chances of "carrying down the bona fide dealer in [the speculator's] collapse."
(Kirkpatrick v. Lyons v. Bonsall, 1872, at 158)
In spite of this concern about increased risk-a concern that recent
experience suggests still very much applies today-the common law did not
completely prohibit speculative derivatives contracts ("difference contracts").
Rather, it discouraged pure speculation in a more subtle fashion: by refusing to
give derivatives speculators access to public courts to enforce their wagers. This
rule of legal unenforceability had an interesting effect. In brief, it drove would-be
derivatives gamblers to form private gambling clubs owned by sophisticated
business parties with both the motive, and the means, to ensure derivatives
gamblers could and would make good on their bets. These private gambling
clubs-the options and futures exchanges-used membership requirements, capital
requirements, and collateral posting requirements to ensure that derivatives
bettors actually could, and would, perform on their contracts. Through this
process of private enforcement, the futures and options exchanges allowed purely
speculative trading to take place while keeping its scope and risks in check. At a
result, common law courts eventually recognized the legality of exchange-based
derivatives trading. (Stout, 1999, at 719)

4. The Modern Approach
The end result was a legal distinction between purely speculative "over-thecounter" (OTC) derivatives entered off an exchange (which were unenforceable in
the courts) and speculative derivatives contracts entered on a private exchange
(which were enforced primarily not by courts, but by the exchanges themselves).
Unfortunately, this time-tested common law system eventually succumbed, first to
the emerging trend toward codification, and then-far more disastrously-to the
more-modern trend of "decodification" (deregulation).
As described in detail by Stout (1999), the codification process began at
the state level, with the passage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
of state "antibucketshop" statutes that declared off-exchange futures and options
contracts not performed by actual physical delivery to be not only unenforceable,
but illegal. The federal government soon followed suit with the Future Trading
Act of 1921 and the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA), which similarly
made off-exchange trading in futures and options on certain listed commodities
illegal under federal law. In 1974, the U.S. Congress created the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and further expanded the CEA to apply to
off-exchange futures and options trading not just in listed commodities, but in "all
other goods and articles" as well.

5

Accounting, Economics, and Law, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2

It thus appeared that, by 1974, the old common law rules governing
difference contracts (derivatives) had been largely replaced by a federal regulatory
scheme. Only a decade later, however, the deregulation trend took hold.
Accustomed to dealing only with commodity-market based derivatives like grain
futures and silver options, the CFTC was unprepared to deal with the sudden
appearance of derivatives contracts based on financial market phenomena, like
interest rates or currency valuations. After initially treating interest rate swaps and
certain other financial derivatives as outside its jurisdiction, the CFTC in the
1980s and 1990s tried to re-assert its regulatory power over financial derivatives.
By that time, however, the OTC derivatives market genie was out of the bottle.
The CFTC's efforts were met with heavy Wall Street resistance and lobbying,
culminating in 2000 with the U.S. Congress' passage (at Wall Street banks'
urging) of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). The
CFMA essentially reversed the old common law rule by declaring off-exchange
derivatives trades by financial institutions to be legally enforceable--including
purely speculative trades between two parties who each lacked an insurable
interest.
Not surprisingly, the legalization of purely speculative OTC derivatives
trading produced an immediate and explosive growth in the size of the OTC
derivatives market. (If we legalized burglary or murder for hire, those markets
would likely grow, too.) According to the Bank for International Settlements, by
the end of 1999 the total notional value of OTC derivatives outstanding was
approximately $88 trillion. (Bank for International Settlements, 2000) By 2008,
the OTC market had grown nearly tenfold, to almost $600 trillion. (Bank for
International Settlements, 2008) This figure amounted to about $100,000 in
notional derivatives bets for each man, woman, child and infant living on the
planet.

5. The Results of the Modern Approach
One would expect the sudden appearance of a $600 trillion market to have
consequences. The rise of the OTC derivatives market soon did. Interestingly,
those consequences were exactly what a nineteenth-century common law judge
would have predicted: an increase in risks to derivatives "investors" without any
apparent compensating social benefit.
The connection between OTC derivatives speculation and investor risk is
straightforward and obvious. Even before passage of the CFMA, regulatory
exemptions legalizing OTC trading in interest rate swaps soon led to spectacular
trading losses and bankruptcies for Orange County, California's pension fund; for
the British bank Barings PLC; and for the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management. (Stout, 1995a and Stout, 2009) Similarly, the CFMA's legalization
DOI: 10.2202/2152-2820.1004
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of other financial derivatives led to the emergence of an OTC credit default swap
market that, rather than reducing systemic risk, eventually caused the 2008
collapses of Bear Stears, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. (Stout, 2009) The sudden
and unexpected collapses of these institutions triggered the Fall 2008 credit crisis.

6. Why Did We Ignore OTC Derivatives' Potential to
Increase Risks?
In the light of recent history, it seems worthwhile to attempt a better
understanding of why-given the common law's longstanding hostility toward
purely speculative derivatives trading-lawmakers by the end of the twentieth
century were eager to dismantle longstanding legal deterrents by passing
legislation to make even purely speculative OTC derivatives legally enforceable.
Part of the answer may lie in simple forgetfulness. Just as residents of a
community that suffers a crime wave and hires police to end it may wonder,
several years later when crime has disappeared, why they are paying for police
officers, the common-law solution of confining derivatives speculation to private
exchanges worked so well that lawmakers and laymen alike lost sight of the
possibility that widespread OTC speculation could cause problems.
Another part of the story is political power. Even if derivatives speculation
imposes social costs by increasing risks, it can be privately profitable for
individual derivatives traders and especially for Wall Street banks that act as
dealers in derivatives markets. The U.S. financial industry is politically powerful
and exerts enormous influence through its lobbying and strategic campaign
contributions to politicians. (Johnson, 2009) Meanwhile, investors who suffer
increased risks without compensating returns from purely speculative derivatives
trading face their own peculiar obstacles to political action. Ex ante, before losing
derivatives traders participate in speculation, they expect to profit from their
speculative activities. Ex post, after they learn they have suffered losses, they are
discouraged from political action both by embarrassment, and by the knowledge
they can protect themselves from future losses simply by refraining from doing
any more trading. (Stout, 1995a) It is accordingly difficult to find a natural
political constituency to push for limitations on derivatives speculation.
But it is also possible that much of the blame for lawmakers' willingness
to ignore the lessons of business history and the wisdom of the common law may
be laid at the foot of economists, many of whom championed the legalization of
OTC derivatives trading in 2000 on the grounds that economic theory viewed
speculation as a socially beneficial activity. (Stout, 1999, at 739) Yet why would
the common law discourage a socially beneficial activity? The answer, perhaps,
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may lie in the possibility that when economists and common law judges speak of
speculation, they are often describing quite different activities.

7. Three Theories of Speculation
Thus we turn to consider in greater detail what, exactly, is "speculation." As it
turns out, the economic literature identifies at least different theories of
speculative trading. These three theories-which we might dub the risk hedging,
information arbitrage, and disagreement models of speculation-carry very
different implications for the economic consequences and desirability of
speculation.
The risk hedging theory views speculative trading as a consequence of
traders' different attitudes toward risk. According to this model, speculators are
traders who extract trading profits by dealing on relatively favorable price terms
with more risk averse hedgers who are willing to accept a less-advantageous price
to avoid the risk of future price changes. For example, a risk averse farmer whose
wealth is tied up in his wheat crop might want to hedge against a change in wheat
prices by selling wheat futures, thus locking in today's price. A less risk averse
speculator-perhaps someone who doesn't mind risk, or someone who can
diversify risk away-might be willing to buy the farmer's futures contracts and
take on the risk of future price changes. Thus, it can be argued that the risk
hedging theory is not really a theory of speculation at all. A risk hedging market is
really a risk reducing, socially beneficial insurance market.
A second explanation for speculative trading that appears frequently in the
economics literature is the information arbitrage model. This second approach,
often associated with a classic article by Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), describes speculators as careful researchers who
invest in information that allows them to identify mispriced assets, allowing them
to trade on superior terms with less-informed market participants selling for
liquidity or buying for consumption. For example, an information arbitrageur
might do meteorological research to predict a drought, and then profit from her
superior prediction by buying wheat futures from liquidity-seeking farmers. The
information arbitrage model accordingly explains speculative trading as a result of
differences in market participants' willingness to invest in information.
Like the risk hedging model, the information arbitrage model implies that
speculative trading produces social benefits. But rather than presuming that
speculative trades benefit both parties by moving risk to the party who can bear it
most cheaply, the information arbitrage theory relies on more indirect forms of
social benefit to defend speculation. An information arbitrageur's trades are not,
strictly speaking, mutually beneficial. Less-informed traders would prefer a
market in which they did not have to compete at a systematic disadvantage against
DOI: 10.2202/2152-2820.1004
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information arbitrageurs. Nevertheless, information arbitrageurs perform at least
two useful economic functions. First, they add useful liquidity to the market,
making it easier for others who want to buy or sell for non-speculative reasons to
find someone to trade with. Second, information arbitrageurs identify mispriced
assets and correct market prices. For example, an information arbitrageur whose
weather research reveals that there is likely to be a drought will buy wheat,
driving up prices. Farmers will respond by planting more wheat, reallocating
social resources in the fashion that helps offset the effects of the drought. These
social benefits justify information-arbitrage trading, even though from the
perspective of the trading parties it is a zero-sum game where the arbitrageur's
profits come at the liquidity trader's expense.
The risk hedging and information arbitrage models of speculation
accordingly explain many economists' general enthusiasm for speculators and for
speculative markets, including (at least before the 2008 crisis) the market for OTC
derivatives. Yet there is a third possible economic model of speculative trading
that comes much closer to describing what laypersons mean when they refer to
"speculation." This third model may also do a better job of explaining both the
explosive growth in OTC derivatives trading that followed passage of the CFMA,
and the economic problems that followed.
The third model of speculation explains speculative trading as a result of
"heterogeneous expectations" or subjective disagreement-that is, differences in
individual traders' subjective beliefs about the future. (Hirshleifer, 1977; Stout,
1995a) Consider an archetypal example. Suppose that Bull and Bear are equally
risk averse. Although neither owns any corporate bonds, both have invested an
equal amount of time and effort into analyzing a particular corporation's (say,
GE's) creditworthiness. Based on their research, which focused on different
sources, Bull and Bear reach differing subjective conclusions about whether GE's
creditworthiness is likely to rise or fall in the near future. Bull predicts a rise; Bear
predicts a fall. Given their differing beliefs, Bull willingly sells CDS "insurance"
on GE bonds that Bear willingly buys. Both take on new risk that neither was
exposed to before. Neither provides liquidity to actual buyers and sellers of GE
bonds (although perhaps each can be said to provide "liquidity" to the other
speculator). Finally, because neither has superior information-just different
information-their trade does not improve the accuracy of GE bond prices.

8. The Reality and Implications of Disagreement-Based
Speculation
The possibility that apparently speculative trading can be motivated by subjective
disagreement seems obvious to many laymen. Why then, do experts often
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overlook it? As noted, part of the answer may lie in many free-market
economists' enthusiasm for the risk hedging and information arbitrage models,
which imply that all is well in the market, and that speculative trading does indeed
serve society's interests.
Another part may lie in game theory, and in particular in a classic article
by Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey that predicted that, given certain assumptions,
rational bulls and bears would never trade on subjective disagreement because
each would assume the other knew something important that he or she didn't
know. (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) This influential "no trade" theorem,
however, relies on unrealistic assumptions about human beliefs and knowledge.
(Stout, 1997). Moreover, whether or not rational actors should trade on the basis
of subjective disagreement, realpeople do trade on disagreement.
This is obvious not only from empirical phenomena like the "winner's
curse" seen in auctions (Thaler, 1988), but also from casual perusal of any
investment newsletter or financial column. And while would-be speculators who
lose money may eventually stop trading-at least if they are rational and capable of
learning-there are plenty of new traders arriving in each generational cohort to
take their place. As P.T. Barnum put it, "there's a sucker born every minute."
(Stout, 1995a, at 637-641)
Given the reality of disagreement-based trading, it is important to consider
its economic implications. Those implications are not favorable. Unlike the risk
hedging and information arbitrage models, the disagreement model of speculative
trading predicts that speculation is economically inefficient because it increases
risk without providing any offsetting social benefit.
Despite the fact that two speculators who trade with each other each
expect to reap trading profits, pure speculation of this sort is at best a zero-sum
game. Bull can only make money if Bear loses money, and vise versa.
Meanwhile, both traders have incurred a cost, because their respective beliefs that
that they can predict the future better than their counterparty can has tempted each
of them to expose him- or herself to a new risk that he or she wasn't exposed to
before, e.g., the risk that GE's credit rating might rise or fall. Similarly,
derivatives betting on interest rates, market prices, or inflation rates increases
speculating traders' risks, just as gambling increases gamblers' risks.

9. Conclusion, With A Note on Where We Are Now
The idea of disagreement-based trading fits well with the popular image of
speculation. It explains a variety of empirical phenomena, such as bubbles and
high turnover rates, seen in speculative markets. (Stout, 1995a; Stout, 1999)
Perhaps most importantly, it provides a firm theoretical foundation for the
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suspicion that speculative trading can increases private risks without providing
offsetting public benefits.
In the process, the theory of disagreement-based trading gives us reason to
question the wisdom of free market ideology in speculative markets. This may be
especially true in the case of speculative OTC derivatives trading. There are at
least two reasons to suspect that, after the passage of the CFMA, the OTC
derivatives market came to be dominated by speculation of the disagreementbased sort. The first reason is the sheer size of the market, which by 2008 had
grown many times larger than the markets for the underlying assets on which
OTC derivatives were being written. For example, by 2008 the notional value of
all outstanding CDS contracts had reached $67 trillion, while the total value of all
bonds and asset-backed securities issued by U.S. firms was only $15 trillion
(Stout 2009). Although notional value for many reasons can be an inaccurate
measure of a market's size, it seems highly questionable to assume that $67
trillion of CDS written on $15 trillion of bonds could all be "insurance." It is
worth remembering, as well, that in 2008 derivatives contracts were not being
written on all securities, but primarily on a favored few, in particular mortgagebacked securities and certain companies' bonds. Thus, the imbalance between the
amount of derivatives bets outstanding, and the value of the underlying assets
being bet upon, may have been even greater.
The second reason to suspect that the OTC derivatives market was
dominated by disagreement-based speculation in 2008 is, quite simply, that the
OTC market produced exactly the result we would expect to see from purely
disagreement-based trading: a dramatic increase in risk unaccompanied by any
evident social benefit. According to the risk hedging model, OTC derivatives
trading should have decreased risk, or at least shifted it to parties who could bear
it more easily. (This view led famed economist Merton Miller to confidently
announce in the 1990s that "derivatives have actually made the world safer, not
riskier ... no serious likelihood of a derivatives-induced financial meltdown
actually exists." (Miller, 1994) The information arbitrage model predicts that
speculative OTC derivatives trading should have neither increased nor reduced
risk, merely moved it around while providing more accurate prices in the process.
Only the disagreement-based model predicts that the opportunity for speculative
trading increases risk. This is, of course, what we have experienced.
As elegant and appealing as the information arbitrage and risk hedging
models of speculation may be, they did a remarkably poor job of predicting the
consequences of the CFMA and the legalization of speculative OTC derivatives
trading. Instead, the market behaved-to our collective misfortune-the way an
enormous gambling market would behave.
Which raises the question: might we do well to return to the common law
rule that purely speculative derivatives contracts entered off an exchange are
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unenforceable as contrary to public policy? Interestingly, the United States'
newly-passed Dodd-Frank financial reform bill moves, at least a bit, in this
direction. In particular, the bill requires that swaps and other financial derivatives
that do not hedge against a "commercial risk" must be traded on a registered
exchange, or on a clearinghouse that performs a similar private enforcement and
risk-reducing function.
Unfortunately, the bill also contains an exemption that could, depending
on future developments, come to swallow the rule. Even purely speculative
derivatives contracts are excused from the exchange/clearinghouse requirement if
those contracts are "not accepted" for clearing by an exchange or clearinghouse.
(Skadden Arps, 2010) Only time will tell, but it seems plausible that Wall Street
will prove inventive enough to come up with new and arcane derivatives contracts
so bizarre and unusual that they are indeed "not accepted" for clearing.
If this should occur, we may very well find ourselves faced again with the
sort of enormous, risk-increasing OTC derivatives market that led to the Fall 2008
crisis. Should such a speculative market arise again, lawmakers would do well to
heed the wisdom of the common law. Gambling-including commercial gambling
through OTC derivatives-should at best be tolerated, not subsidized through
public enforcement of gamblers' wagers.
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